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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature Of The Case 
 
 The state appeals from the district court’s order granting suppression of 
evidence.  The state challenges the district court’s determination that although 
the officer had reasonable suspicion that the car he stopped violated Idaho’s 
window tint laws, the stop was nevertheless unlawful because the car was in 
compliance with the tint laws of another state. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 A state trooper stopped the car Debra Noeller was driving because “the 
side and rear windows appeared to be darker than … what the law allows.”  
(Prelim. Tr., p. 4, L. 4 – p. 6, L. 4; p. 7, L. 11 – p. 9, L. 13; p. 10, Ls. 9-12.)  After 
Noeller and her passenger gave incompatible answers to troopers regarding their 
trip and regarding each other, and because the car was not registered to either of 
them, troopers requested consent to search the car.  (Prelim. Tr., p. 14, L. 12 – p. 
20, L. 17; p. 81, L. 21 – p. 85, L. 4.)  Noeller granted consent, and the search 
produced evidence of methamphetamine and paraphernalia.  (Prelim. Tr., p. 25, 
L. 14 – p. 26, L. 23; p. 28, L. 20 – p. 32, L. 14; p. 34, L. 7 – p. 39, L. 8; p. 84, L. 
16 – p. 85, L. 4.)  Using a tint meter a trooper also checked the window tint, and 
found the sides and back windows ranging from 32% to 12% light transmission, 
generally darker than allowed by Idaho law.  (Prelim. Tr., p. 32, L. 15 – p. 34, L. 
4.) 
 The state charged Noeller with trafficking in 400 grams or more of 
methamphetamine for the large amounts hidden in the car and possession of 
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methamphetamine for the amount in her purse.  (R., pp. 45-46.)  Noeller moved 
to suppress the evidence from the stop and search.  (R., pp. 54-55.)  The district 
court granted the motion, finding there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop 
because even though the window tinting was not in compliance with Idaho law, it 
was in compliance with law of the state where the car was registered—Arizona, 






 Did the district court err when it concluded that reasonable suspicion the 
car was being operated in violation of Idaho’s window tint law was insufficient to 







Reasonable Suspicion That Noeller’s Car Violated Idaho’s Window Tinting 




 There was no dispute that the trooper had reasonable suspicion that 
Noeller was operating a car in violation of Idaho’s window tint law.  (See R., p. 
117  (“Trooper Peeples observed a silver Chevy Cobalt traveling east bound that 
appeared to have darker window tinting on the side and rear windows than what 
is allowed by Idaho law.”).)  The district court, however, “[found] that the Idaho 
law regarding window tinting, I.C. § 49-944, applies only to vehicles registered in 
Idaho.”  (R., p. 122.)  Finding no reasonable suspicion the window tinting violated 
Arizona law, the district court suppressed all evidence discovered as a result of 
the traffic stop and dismissed the charges.  (R., pp. 122, 132.)  Applying relevant 
legal standards shows the district court erred by concluding that suspicion the car 
was being driven in violation of Idaho’s laws was insufficient to justify the traffic 
stop. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court 
accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial 
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those 
facts.  State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).  The 
interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over which 
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the appellate court exercises free review.  State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 
798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
 
C. Reasonable Suspicion The Car Was Being Driven In Violation Of Idaho’s 
Window Tint Laws Justified The Traffic Stop 
 
 “A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants 
and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures.”  State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785 
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).  Limited 
investigatory detentions are permissible when justified by an officer’s reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).  “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate 
possible criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the 
vehicle is being driven contrary to traffic laws.”  Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 
P.3d at 785 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)).  “Reasonable 
suspicion requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct 
on the part of the officer.”  State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 
675 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted).  Whether an officer possessed reasonable 
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the 
officer at or before the time of the stop.  Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at 
1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 In this case the district court found that the car driven by Noeller 
“appeared to have darker window tinting on the side and rear windows than what 
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is allowed by Idaho law.”  (R., p. 117.)  Idaho law disallows tinting darker than 
35% light transmission (“with a tolerance limit of plus or minus three percent 
(3%)”) for the driver’s side window, the passenger’s side window, and the rear 
windshield.  I.C. § 49-944(1)(b).  The light transmission for side windows to the 
rear of the driver must be 10% (with a tolerance of 3%) or more.  I.C. § 49-
944(1)(c).   Idaho law makes it an infraction to “operate on the public highways … 
any motor vehicle with a windshield or windows which are not in compliance with 
the provisions of this section.”  I.C. § 49-944(2).  Because the trooper reasonably 
suspected the side and rear windows of the car were less than the allowed light 
transmission, he had reasonable suspicion of a traffic infraction, which justified 
the traffic stop. 
 The district court’s legal conclusion that the Idaho window tint statute did 
not apply to Noeller’s conduct because the car she was driving was registered in 
Arizona was erroneous.  The Idaho window tinting statute provides that “[n]o 
person shall operate on the public highways … any motor vehicle with a 
windshield or windows which are not in compliance with the provisions of this 
section.”   I.C. § 49-944(2) (emphasis added).  This language simply forecloses 
the district court’s analysis that cars registered in Arizona fall outside the scope 
of this statute.  
 To justify its failure to apply the plain language of the statute the district 
court cited State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 294 P.3d 1121 (2013).  (R., pp. 121-
22 (“guided by the Morgan decision” the district court found the window tinting 
statute “applies only to vehicles registered in Idaho”).)  In Morgan the Idaho 
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Supreme Court determined that the requirement of display of both front and rear 
plates in I.C. § 49-428 “does not extend to vehicles registered in other states.”  
154 Idaho at 112, 294 P.3d at 1124.  Chapter 4 of Title 49, where I.C. § 49-428 is 
located, addresses registration and licensing of vehicles in the State of Idaho.  
Thus, when I.C. § 49-428 requires that “[l]icense plates assigned to a motor 
vehicle” be “attached, one (1) in the front and the other in the rear,” the natural 
reading of that statute is that it is limited to the license plates assigned pursuant 
to that chapter.  Such would not, by the plain language of the statute, apply to 
license plates assigned by other states under their laws.  Because the holding of 
Morgan was limited to the statute at issue, the district court erred by reading 
Morgan as holding that Idaho’s traffic laws generally do not apply to motorists 
from out-of-state. 
 Because Morgan was based on the scope of the statute in question, and 
not on some broad unarticulated concept that none of Idaho’s traffic laws apply to 
out-of-state motorists, the district court’s expansion of Morgan’s holding was 
erroneous.  The plain language of I.C. § 49-944(2) shows it applies to any car 
driven in Idaho.  Noeller was driving the car in Idaho.  Therefore reasonable 
suspicion she was violating I.C. § 49-944(2) provided constitutional grounds for 






 The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s 
order of suppression, vacate its order dismissing, and remand for further 
proceedings. 




      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
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